“Corporate AI Labs’ Odd Role in Their Own Governance” by Corporate AI Labs’ Odd Role in Their Own Governance

This is a link post. Executive Summary Plenty of attention rests on artificial intelligence developers’ non-technical contributions to ensuring safe development of advanced AI: Their corporate structure, their internal guidelines (‘RSPs’), and their work on policy. We argue that strong profitability incentives increasingly force these efforts into ineffectiveness. As a result, less hope should be placed on AI corporations’ internal governance, and more scrutiny should be afforded to their policy contributions. TL;DR Only Profit-Maximizers Stay At The Frontier Investors and compute providers have extensive leverage over labs and need to justify enormous spending  As a result, leading AI corporations are forced to maximize profits This leads them to advocate against external regulatory constraints or shape them in their favor Constraints from Corporate Structure Are Dangerously Ineffective Ostensibly binding corporate structures are easily evaded or abandoned Political and public will cannot be enforced or ensured via corporate structure [...] ---Outline:(00:09) Executive Summary(00:41) TL;DR(02:14) Introduction(04:13) Only Profit-Maximizers Stay At The Frontier(09:48) Constraints from Corporate Structure Are Dangerously Ineffective(13:12) Hope In RSPs Is Misguided(17:58) For-Profit Policy Work Is Called Corporate Lobbying(24:09) Conclusion--- First published: July 29th, 2024 Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/6K3Azzhqboiqjt7tX/corporate-ai-labs-odd-role-in-their-own-governance --- Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.